BRIAN KEISACKER IS UNETHICAL AND ILLEGALY SERVES AS A SERVES A "CONSUMER REPRESENTATIVE" IN VIOLATION OF SARASOTA COUNTY ORDINANCE 22-127(3) ON THE SARASOTA COUNTY GENERAL CONTRACTORS LICENSING AND EXAMINING BOARD.

Administrative Proceedings: A Fair Hearing.
With re-spect to action taken by administrative agencies, the Court has held that the demands of due process do not require a hearing at the initial stage, or at any particular point in the proceeding, so long as a hearing is held before the final order becomes effective.449 In Bowles v. Willingham,450 the Court sustained orders fixing maximum rents issued without a hearing at any stage, saying “where Congress has provided for judicial review after the regulations or orders have been made effective it has done all that due process under the war emergency requires.” But where, after consideration of charges brought against an employer by a complaining union, the National Labor Relations Board undertook to void an agreement between an employer and another independent union, the latter was entitled to notice and an opportunity to participate in the proceedings.451 Although a taxpayer must be afforded a fair opportunity for a hearing in connection with the collection of taxes,452 collection by distraint of personal property is lawful if the taxpayer is allowed a hearing thereafter.453

When the Constitution requires a hearing,
it requires a fair one, held before a tribunal that meets currently prevailing standards of impartiality.454 A party must be given an opportunity not only to present evidence, but also to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. Those who are brought into contest with the government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed at control of their activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the government proposes and to be heard upon the proposal before the final command is issued.455 But a variance between the charges and findings will not invalidate administrative proceedings where the record shows that at no time during the hearing was there any misunderstanding as to the basis of the complaint.456 The mere admission of evidence that would be inadmissible in judicial proceedings does not vitiate the order of an administrative agency.457 A provision that such a body shall not be controlled by rules of evidence does not, however, justify orders without a foundation in evidence having rational probative force. Hearsay may be received in an administrative hearing and may constitute by itself substantial evidence in support of an agency determination, provided that there are present factors which assure the underlying reliability and probative value of the evidence and, at least in the case at hand, where the claimant before the agency had the opportunity to subpoena the witnesses and cross-examine them with regard to the evidence.458 Although the Court has recognized that in some circumstances a “fair hearing” implies a right to oral argument,459 it has refused to lay down a general rule that would cover all cases.460

In the light of the historically unquestioned power of a commanding officer summarily to exclude civilians from the area of his command, and applicable Navy regulations that confirm this authority, together with a stipulation in the contract between a restaurant concessionaire and the Naval Gun Factory forbidding employment on the premises of any person not meeting security requirements, due process was not denied by the summary exclusion on security grounds of the concessionaire’s cook, without hearing or advice as to the basis for the exclusion. The
Fifth Amendment does not require a trial-type hearing in every conceivable case of governmental impairment of private interest.461 Because the Civil Rights Commission acts solely as an investigative and fact-finding agency and makes no adjudications, the Court, in Hannah v. Larche,462 upheld supplementary rules of procedure adopted by the Commission, independently of statutory authorization, under which state electoral officials and others accused of discrimination and summoned to appear at its hearings, are not apprised of the identity of their accusers, and witnesses, including the former, are not accorded a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses or accusers testifying at such hearings. Such procedural rights, the Court maintained, have not been granted by grand juries, congressional committees, or administrative agencies conducting purely fact-finding investigations in no way determining private rights.

Footnotes
449
Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152, 153 (1941). back_to_text
450
321 U.S. 503, 521 (1944). back_to_text
451
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). back_to_text
452
Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922). back_to_text
453
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931). Cf. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 593 (1881); Passavant v. United States, 148 U.S. 214 (1893). The collection of taxes is, however, very nearly a wholly unique area. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 127 n.17 (1971) (Justice Brennan concurring in part and dissenting in part). On the limitations on private prejudgment collection, see Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). back_to_text
454
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950). But see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170 n.5 (Justice Powell), 196–99 (Justice White) (1974) (hearing before probably partial officer at pretermination stage). back_to_text
455
Margan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1938). The Court has experienced some difficulty with application of this principle to administrative hearings and subsequent review in selective service cases. Compare Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955) (conscientious objector contesting his classification before appeals board must be furnished copy of recommendation submitted by Department of Justice; only by being appraised of the arguments and conclusions upon which recommendations were based would he be enabled to present his case effectively), with United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953) (in auxiliary hearing that culminated in a Justice Department report and recommendation, it is sufficient that registrant be provided with resume of adverse evidence in FBI report because the “imperative needs of mobilization and national vigilance” mandate a minimum of “litigious interruption”), and Gonzales v. United States, 364 U.S. 59 (1960) (five-to-four decision finding no due process violation when petitioner (1) at departmental proceedings was not permitted to rebut statements attributed to him by his local board, because the statements were in his file and he had opportunity to rebut both before hearing officer and appeal board, nor (2) at trial was denied access to hearing officer’s notes and report, because he failed to show any need and did have Department recommendations). back_to_text
456
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 349–50 (1938). back_to_text
457
Western Chem. Co. v. United States, 271 U.S. 268 (1926). See also United States v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265 U.S. 274, 288 (1924). back_to_text
458
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). back_to_text
459
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). back_to_text
460
FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 274–77 (1949). See also Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 710 (1945). See Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C §§ 10011011. Cf. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 637, 646 (1962), in which the majority rejected Justice Black’s dissenting thesis that the dismissal with prejudice of a damage suit without notice to the client and grounded upon the dilatory tactics of his attorney, and the latter’s failure to appear at a pre-trial conference, amounted to a taking of property without due process of law. back_to_text
461
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). Four dissenters, Justices Brennan, Black, Douglas, and Chief Justice Warren, emphasized the inconsistency between the Court’s acknowledgment that the cook had a right not to have her entry badge taken away for arbitrary reasons, and its rejection of her right to be told in detail the reasons for such action. The case has subsequently been cited as involving an “extraordinary situation.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 n.10 (1970). Manifesting a disposition to adjudicate on non-constitutional grounds dismissals of employees under the Federal Loyalty Program, the Court, in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955), invalidated, as in excess of its delegated authority, a finding of reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the petitioner by a Loyalty Review Board which, on its own initiative, reopened his case after he had twice been cleared by his Agency Loyalty Board, and arrived at its conclusion on the basis of adverse information not offered under oath and supplied by informants, not all of whom were known to the Review Board and none of whom was disclosed to petitioner for cross-examination by him. The Board was found not to possess any power to review on its own initiative. Concurring, Justices Douglas and Black condemned as irreconcilable with due process and fair play the use of faceless informers whom the petitioner is unable to confront and cross-examine. In Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956), also decided on the basis of statutory interpretation, there is an intimation that grave due process issues would be raised by the application to federal employees, not occupying sensitive positions, of a measure which authorized, in the interest of national security, summary suspensions and unreviewable dismissals of allegedly disloyal employees by agency heads. In Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957), and Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959), the Court nullified dismissals for security reasons by invoking an established rule of administrative law to the effect that an administrator must comply with procedures outlined in applicable agency regulations, notwithstanding that such regulations conform to more rigorous substantive and procedural standards than are required by Congress or that the agency action is discretionary in nature. In both of the last cited decisions, dismissals of employees as security risks were set aside by reason of the failure of the employing agency to conform the dismissal to its established security regulations. See Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). Again avoiding constitutional issues, the Court, in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), invalidated the security clearance procedure required of defense contractors by the Defense Department as being unauthorized either by law or presidential order. However, the Court suggested that it would condemn, on grounds of denial of due process, any enactment or Executive Order which sanctioned a comparable department security clearance program, under which a defense contractor’s employee could have his security clearance revoked without a hearing at which he had the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whittaker concurred without passing on the validity of such procedure, if authorized. Justice Clark dissented. See also the dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas and Black in Beard v. Stahr, 370 U.S. 41, 43 (1962), and in Williams v. Zuckert, 371 U.S. 531, 533 (1963). back_to_text
462
363 U.S. 420, 493, 499 (1960). Justices Douglas and Black dissented on the ground that when the Commission summons a person accused of violating a federal election law with a view to ascertaining whether the accusation may be sustained, it acts in lieu of a grand jury or a committing magistrate, and therefore should be obligated to afford witnesses the procedural protection herein denied. Congress subsequently amended the law to require that any person who is defamed, degraded, or incriminated by evidence or testimony presented to the Commission be afforded the opportunity to appear and be heard in executive session, with a reasonable number of additional witnesses requested by him, before the Commission can make public such evidence or testimony. Further, any such person, before the evidence or testimony is released, must be afforded an opportunity to appear publicly to state his side and to file verified statements with the Commission which it must release with any report or other document containing defaming, degrading, or incriminating evidence or testimony. Pub. L. 91–521, § 4, 84 Stat. 1357 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 1975a(e). Cf. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969). back_to_text

BRIAN KEISACKER:
Brian Keisacker Unqualified
BRIAN KEISACKER:
BRIAN KEISACKER UNETHICAL 156
BRIAN KEISACKER:
BRIAN KEISACKER INTEGRITY
BRIAN KEISACKER:
BRIAN KEISACKER Equal Dignity
BRIAN KEISACKER:
BRIAN KEISACKER UNFAIR JUSTICE
BRIAN KEISACKER:
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BRIAN KEISACKER:
BRIAN KEISACKER Shameful 101

BRIAN KEISACKER:

BRIAN KEISACKER IGNORES THE LAW

BRIAN KEISACKER:

BRIAN KEISACKER UNETHICAL 102

BRIAN KEISACKER:
BRIANKEISACKER.COM VIOLATED DUE PROCESS
BRIAN KEISACKER:
BRIAN KEISACKER IGNORES THE LAW
Brian Keisacker Mistake of law
BRIAN KEISACKER:

Brian Keisacker Unethical Lawyer

I CERTAINLY WOULD NOT RECOMMEND EVER HIRING THIS UNETHICAL LAWYER - BRIAN KEISACKER!
Brian Keisacker is Unethical
Brian Keisacker works for Ulrich, Scarlet, Wickman & Dean, P.A. in Sarasota, Florida.


One can only apply the facts and deduce that
Brian Keisacker is Unethical!

Brian Keisacker
BRIAN KEISACKER UNFAIR JUSTICE 2
Brian Keisacker
BRIAN KEISACKER unethical
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Brian Keisacker Outraged
Brian Keisacker
BRIAN KEISACKER Justice
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Brian Keisacker
Brian Keisacker Unprofessional Unethical

Brian Keisacker would rather be unethical, than follow the Sarasota County Ordinance 22-127(3).

From the transcript of August 15, 2019:
"…Attorney
Brian Keisacker, the rules -- the rules regulating the Florida Bar state that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. That rule is under the ethics Chapter 4, which is 4-8.4(d) as in David. I hereby request that you recuse yourself from this hearing and this board."

"…
I believe that you're violating the rules regulating the Florida Bar and I believe that it's unethical and you should not be serving on this board. And you've known for a long time that you derive income from the construction industry and are unqualified to serve on this board."
CHAIRMAN
KEISACKER: And if you feel that way, I invite you to inform the Florida Bar that you feel I'm in violation --
Arrogance and unethical behavior by
Brian Keisacker!
Brian Keisacker Due Process
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BRIAN KEISACKER Injustice 2
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BRIAN KEISACKER UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR
BRIAN KEISACKER
BRIAN KEISACKER unethical behavior
Brian Keisacker

SEE SARASOTA COUNTY ORDINANCE 22-127(3)

BRIAN KEISACKER

Brian Keisacker Sarasota, Florida.

SEE SARASOTA COUNTY ORDINANCE 22-127(3)

  • (c)  The term "Consumer Representatives" used in this section shall be defined as set forth in F.S. § 489.131(10).
(2) Quorum. The General Contractors Licensing and Examining Board shall require six members present for a quorum and a majority of affirmative votes shall be required for passage of any Board action. The Mechanical Contractors Licensing and Examining Board shall require six members present for a quorum and a majority of affirmative votes shall be required for passage of any Board action.
  • (3)  Qualifications. Architects and Engineers are not required to be professionally registered in the State of Florida as a condition of appointment to a Board. The citizen at large member (Lawyer Brian Keisacker) shall be selected for appointment from Sarasota County resident applicants deriving no income from any source connected with the construction industry. Appointment shall be based on demonstrable training and experience acceptable to the Board of County Commissioners. PLAIN AND SIMPLE! Brian Keisacker is defiant!
  • 4)  Term of Appointment. Board members shall be appointed for a period of three years. The Board of County Commissioners may relieve Licensing Board members of their appointment for failure to attend a majority of the meetings each fiscal year. The appointed members of the Boards shall proceed to select a Chairman, Vice Chairman and a Secretary.
If a lawyer, namely Brian Keisacker does not know what due process is, ignores the legal doctrine of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, did not giving proper notice to a litigant before issuing a ruling stated notice was given when it wasn’t that was overturned by the Circuit Court and who serves on a local Sarasota County contractor board illegally as a consumer representative in violation of the ordinance then what was the purpose of going to law school at Stetson Law School? Is Brian Keisacker untrained? Is Brian Keisacker that corrupt and one sided? Is Brian Keisacker purposefully ignorant to the law? Or is Brian David Keisacker corrupt? You decide and ask yourself, would you even dream about hiring Brian Keisacker for any reason after discovering who he is? All the above are supported by the facts!

It is our beliefs from personal experiences with lawyer Brian D. Keisacker, has violated Respondent’s constitution rights where Brian D. Keisacker as chairman of the Sarasota County General Contractors Licensing and Examining Board did not accord due process guaranteed under the United States Constitution and served as a consumer representative, Brian Keisacker is in clear violation of Sarasota County Ordinance 22-127(3), where Brian Keisacker earns income from the construction industry.
Yet
Brian Keisacker refuses to follow the law:


BRIAN D KEISACKER UNETHICAL LAWYER

Brian Keisacker
Brian Keisacker sits on the Board as a “Citizen at large (consumer representative)," one of three such positions required by Sarasota County Code § 22-127(1)(a). Of note, "[t]he citizen at large member shall be selected for appointment from Sarasota County resident applicants deriving no income from any source connected with the construction industry." Sarasota County Code § 22-127(3) (emphasis added). See also, § 489.131(10), Florida Statutes (2019).
Brian Keisacker represents dozens of clients in matters that are directly related to the construction industry.

In a résumé submitted with Brian Keisacker’s advisory application, Keisacker states:


“Prepare and file pleadings, motions, and responses to all aspects civil litigation in areas including foreclosure, boundary disputes,
construction defects…”


Since Brian Keisacker practices construction law and collects fees from construction related clients, he is currently deriving income from the construction industry, which is prohibited for individuals serving on the Board in his capacity. Brian Keisacker’s application to serve on the Board clearly and definitively indicates Brian Keisacker derives income from the construction industry, thereby defeating the intended purpose of a citizen/consumer representative.

ATTORNEY BRIAN KEISACKER 323

Brian Keisacker’s specializes in construction law and advertises on their website as follows:

“Our firm provides a variety of services to contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, homeowners in connection with construction law matters, including preparation, negotiation and review of construction agreements as well as the preparation and service of notices to owner, claims of lien, contractor final affidavits and other document required by the Florida Construction Lien Law. Should litigation become necessary to enforce or defend the claim of a construction lienor, we prosecute and defend all aspects of lien foreclosure actions.”

Therefore, Brian Keisacker must not be on the Sarasota County General Contractors Licensing and Examining Board, yet Brian Keisacker is defiant and will not follow the ethical rules Brian Keisacker is supposed to follow.
In sum, since
Brian Keisacker occupies a seat on the Board which forbids earning income from the construction industry, Brian Keisacker may NOT legally serve the citizens of Sarasota County on its General Contractors Licensing and Examining Board, and Brian Keisacker cannot and must not preside over matters within the jurisdiction of the Board. ALL Respondents have a right to be heard before a Board comprised of individuals who meet all of the statute and ordinance requirements for service on the Board. Brian Keisacker

BRIAN KEISACKER SHOULD NOT BE SERVING ON THE CONTRACTOR BOARD AS A CONSUMER REPRESENTATIVE WHEN HE EARNS INCOME FROM THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSRTY. THIS IS IMMORAL AND UNETHICAL.