The Requirements of Due Process.
Although due process tol-erates variances in procedure “appropriate to the nature of the case,”751 it is nonetheless possible to identify its core goals and requirements. First, “[p]rocedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.752 Thus, the required elements of due process are those that “minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations” by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a state proposes to deprive them of protected interests.753 The core of these requirements is notice and a hearing before an impartial tribunal. Due process may also require an opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, and for discovery; that a decision be made based on the record, and that a party be allowed to be represented by counsel.

(1)
Notice. “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”754 This may include an obligation, upon learning that an attempt at notice has failed, to take “reasonable followup measures” that may be available.755 In addition, notice must be sufficient to enable the recipient to determine what is being proposed and what he must do to prevent the deprivation of his interest.756 Ordinarily, service of the notice must be reasonably structured to assure that the person to whom it is directed receives it.757 Such notice, however, need not describe the legal procedures necessary to protect one’s interest if such procedures are otherwise set out in published, generally available public sources.758

(2)
Hearing. “[S]ome form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property [or liberty] interest.”759 This right is a “basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment . . . .”760 Thus, the notice of hearing and the opportunity to be heard “must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”761

(3)
Impartial Tribunal. Just as in criminal and quasi-criminal cases,762 an impartial decisionmaker is an essential right in civil proceedings as well.763 “The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law. . . . At the same time, it preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness . . . by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.”764 Thus, a showing of bias or of strong implications of bias was deemed made where a state optometry board, made up of only private practitioners, was proceeding against other licensed optometrists for unprofessional conduct because they were employed by corporations. Since success in the board’s effort would redound to the personal benefit of private practitioners, the Court thought the interest of the board members to be sufficient to disqualify them.765

There is, however, a “presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators,”
766 so that the burden is on the objecting party to show a conflict of interest or some other specific reason for disqualification of a specific officer or for disapproval of the system. Thus, combining functions within an agency, such as by allowing members of a State Medical Examining Board to both investigate and adjudicate a physician’s suspension, may raise substantial concerns, but does not by itself establish a violation of due process.767 The Court has also held that the official or personal stake that school board members had in a decision to fire teachers who had engaged in a strike against the school system in violation of state law was not such so as to disqualify them.768 Sometimes, to ensure an impartial tribunal, the Due Process Clause requires a judge to recuse himself from a case. In Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., the Court noted that “most matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level,” and that “matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, [and] remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion.”769 The Court added, however, that “[t]he early and leading case on the subject” had “concluded that the Due Process Clause incorporated the common-law rule that a judge must recuse himself when he has ‘a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest’ in a case.”770 In addition, although “[p]ersonal bias or prejudice ‘alone would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the Due Process Clause,’ ” there “are circumstances ‘in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’ ”771 These circumstances include “where a judge had a financial interest in the outcome of a case” or “a conflict arising from his participation in an earlier proceeding.”772 In such cases, “[t]he inquiry is an objective one. The Court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’ ”773 In Caperton, a company appealed a jury verdict of $50 million, and its chairman spent $3 million to elect a justice to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia at a time when “[i]t was reasonably foreseeable . . . that the pending case would be before the newly elected justice.”774 This $3 million was more than the total amount spent by all other supporters of the justice and three times the amount spent by the justice’s own committee. The justice was elected, declined to recuse himself, and joined a 3-to-2 decision overturning the jury verdict. The Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion written by Justice Kennedy, “conclude[d] that there is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”775

Subsequently, in
Williams v. Pennsylvania, the Court found that the right of due process was violated when a judge on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court—who participated in case denying post-conviction relief to a prisoner convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death—had, in his former role as a district attorney, given approval to seek the death penalty in the prisoner’s case.776 Relying on Caperton, which the Court viewed as having set forth an “objective standard” that requires recusal when the likelihood of bias on the part of the judge is “too high to be constitutionally tolerable,”777 the Williams Court specifically held that there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge had previously had a “significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant’s case.”778 The Court based its holding, in part, on earlier cases which had found impermissible bias occurs when the same person serves as both “accuser” and “adjudicator” in a case, which the Court viewed as having happened in Williams.779 It also reasoned that authorizing another person to seek the death penalty represents “significant personal involvement” in a case,780 and took the view that the involvement of multiple actors in a case over many years “only heightens”—rather than mitigates—the “need for objective rules preventing the operation of bias that otherwise might be obscured.”781 As a remedy, the case was remanded for reevaluation by the reconstituted Pennsylvania Supreme Court, notwithstanding the fact that the judge in question did not cast the deciding vote, as the Williams Court viewed the judge’s participation in the multi-member panel’s deliberations as sufficient to taint the public legitimacy of the underlying proceedings and constitute reversible error.782

(4) Confrontation and Cross-Examination. “In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”
783 Where the “evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealously,” the individual’s right to show that it is untrue depends on the rights of confrontation and cross-examination. “This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, . . . but also in all types of cases where administrative . . . actions were under scrutiny.”784

(5) Discovery. The Court has never directly confronted this issue, but in one case it did observe in
dictum that “where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.”785 Some federal agencies have adopted discovery rules modeled on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Administrative Conference has recommended that all do so.786 There appear to be no cases, however, holding they must, and there is some authority that they cannot absent congressional authorization.787

(6) Decision on the Record. Although this issue arises principally in the administrative law area,
788 it applies generally. “[T]he decisionmaker’s conclusion . . . must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing. To demonstrate compliance with this elementary requirement, the decisionmaker should state the reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied on, though his statement need not amount to a full opinion or even formal findings of fact and conclusions of law.”789

(7) Counsel. In
Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court held that a government agency must permit a welfare recipient who has been denied benefits to be represented by and assisted by counsel.790 In the years since, the Court has struggled with whether civil litigants in court and persons before agencies who could not afford retained counsel should have counsel appointed and paid for, and the matter seems far from settled. The Court has established a presumption that an indigent does not have the right to appointed counsel unless his “physical liberty” is threatened.791 Moreover, that an indigent may have a right to appointed counsel in some civil proceedings where incarceration is threatened does not mean that counsel must be made available in all such cases. Rather, the Court focuses on the circumstances in individual cases, and may hold that provision of counsel is not required if the state provides appropriate alternative safeguards.792

Though the calculus may vary, cases not involving detention also are determined on a case-by-case basis using a balancing standard.
793
For instance, in a case involving a state proceeding to terminate the parental rights of an indigent without providing her counsel, the Court recognized the parent’s interest as “an extremely important one.” The Court, however, also noted the state’s strong interest in protecting the welfare of children. Thus, as the interest in correct fact-finding was strong on both sides, the proceeding was relatively simple, no features were present raising a risk of criminal liability, no expert witnesses were present, and no “specially troublesome” substantive or procedural issues had been raised, the litigant did not have a right to appointed counsel.
794 In other due process cases involving parental rights, the Court has held that due process requires special state attention to parental rights.795 Thus, it would appear likely that in other parental right cases, a right to appointed counsel could be established.

Footnotes
751
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). back_to_text
752
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). “[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976). back_to_text
753
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). At times, the Court has also stressed the dignitary importance of procedural rights, the worth of being able to defend one’s interests even if one cannot change the result. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1978); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Nelson v. Adams, 529 U.S. 460 (2000) (amendment of judgement to impose attorney fees and costs to sole shareholder of liable corporate structure invalid without notice or opportunity to dispute). back_to_text
754
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). See also Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996) (res judicata may not apply where taxpayer who challenged a county’s occupation tax was not informed of prior case and where taxpayer interests were not adequately protected). back_to_text
755
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 235 (2006) (state’s certified letter, intended to notify a property owner that his property would be sold unless he satisfied a tax delinquency, was returned by the post office marked “unclaimed”; the state should have taken additional reasonable steps to notify the property owner, as it would have been practicable for it to have done so). back_to_text
756
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970). back_to_text
757
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1974); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982). back_to_text
758
City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999). back_to_text
759
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). “Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard.” Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863). back_to_text
760
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972). See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170–71 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter concurring). back_to_text
761
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). back_to_text
762
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). back_to_text
763
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). back_to_text
764
Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982). back_to_text
765
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). Or, the conduct of deportation hearings by a person who, while he had not investigated the case heard, was also an investigator who must judge the results of others’ investigations just as one of them would some day judge his, raised a substantial problem which was resolved through statutory construction). Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). back_to_text
766
Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941). back_to_text
767
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). Where an administrative officer is acting in a prosecutorial, rather than judicial or quasi-judicial role, an even lesser standard of impartiality applies. Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 248–50 (1980) (regional administrator assessing fines for child labor violations, with penalties going into fund to reimburse cost of system of enforcing child labor laws). But “traditions of prosecutorial discretion do not immunize from judicial scrutiny cases in which enforcement decisions of an administrator were motivated by improper factors or were otherwise contrary to law.” Id. at 249. back_to_text
768
Hortonville Joint School Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976). Compare Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170 n.5 (1974) (Justice Powell), with id. at 196–99 (Justice White), and 216 (Justice Marshall). back_to_text
769
556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 6 (2009) (citations omitted). back_to_text
770
556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 6, quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). back_to_text
771
556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 6 (citations omitted). back_to_text
772
556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 7, 9. back_to_text
773
556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 11 (citations omitted). back_to_text
774
556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 15. back_to_text
775
556 U.S. ___, No. 08–22, slip op. at 14. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, dissented, asserting that “a ‘probability of bias’ cannot be defined in any limited way,” “provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal will be constitutionally required,” and “will inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are biased, however groundless those charges may be.” Slip. op. at 1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The majority countered that “[t]he facts now before us are extreme in any measure.” Slip op. at 17. back_to_text
776
579 U.S. ___, No. 15–5040, slip op. at 1 (2016). back_to_text
777
Id. (internal quotations omitted). back_to_text
778
Id. at 5–6. back_to_text
779
Id. at 6 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136–37 (1955)). The Court also noted that “[n]o attorney is more integral to the accusatory process than a prosecutor who participates in a major adversary decision.” Id. at 7. back_to_text
780
Id. at 9. See also id. at 10 (noting that the judge in this case had highlighted the number of capital cases in which he participated when campaigning for judicial office). back_to_text
781
Id. at 8. back_to_text
782
Id. at 12–13. Likewise, the Court rejected the argument that remanding the case would not cure the underlying due process violation because the disqualified judge’s views might still influence his former colleagues, as an “inability to guarantee complete relief for a constitutional violation . . . does not justify withholding a remedy altogether.” Id. at 14. back_to_text
783
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). See also ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 93–94 (1913). Cf. § 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). back_to_text
784
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496–97 (1959). But see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (where authors of documentary evidence are known to petitioner and he did not subpoena them, he may not complain that agency relied on that evidence). Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343–45 (1976). back_to_text
785
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959), quoted with approval in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970). back_to_text
786
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 571 (1968–1970). back_to_text
787
FMC v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964). back_to_text
788
The exclusiveness of the record is fundamental in administrative law. See § 7(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(e). However, one must show not only that the agency used ex parte evidence but that he was prejudiced thereby. Market Street R.R. v. Railroad Comm’n, 324 U.S. 548 (1945) (agency decision supported by evidence in record, its decision sustained, disregarding ex parte evidence). back_to_text
789
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (citations omitted). back_to_text
790
397 U.S. 254, 270–71 (1970). back_to_text
791
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). The Court purported to draw this rule from Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no per se right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings). To introduce this presumption into the balancing, however, appears to disregard the fact that the first factor of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), upon which the Court (and dissent) relied, relates to the importance of the interest to the person claiming the right. Thus, at least in this context, the value of the first Eldridge factor is diminished. The Court noted, however, that the Mathews v. Eldridge standards were drafted in the context of the generality of cases and were not intended for case-by-case application. Cf.424 U.S. at 344 (1976). back_to_text
792
Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. ___, No. 10–10, slip op. (2011). The Turner Court denied an indigent defendant appointed counsel in a civil contempt proceeding to enforce a child support order, even though the defendant faced incarceration unless he showed an inability to pay the arrearages. The party opposing the defendant in the case was not the state, but rather the unrepresented custodial parent, nor was the case unusually complex. A five-Justice majority, though denying a right to counsel, nevertheless reversed the contempt order because it found that the procedures followed remained inadequate. back_to_text
793
452 U.S. at 31–32. The balancing decision is to be made initially by the trial judge, subject to appellate review. Id. at 32 back_to_text
794
452 U.S. at 27–31. The decision was a five-to-four, with Justices Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger in the majority, and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in dissent. Id. at 35, 59.
795
See, e.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (indigent entitled to state-funded blood testing in a paternity action the state required to be instituted); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (imposition of higher standard of proof in case involving state termination of parental rights).

BRIAN KEISACKER:
Brian Keisacker Callous Indifference
BRIAN KEISACKER:
BRIAN KEISACKER UNWILLING TO ADHERE to law
BRIAN KEISACKER:
BRIAN KEISACKER NO MORALITY
BRIAN KEISACKER:
BRIAN KEISACKER 1000
BRIAN KEISACKER:
BRIAN KEISACKER UNFAIR JUSTICE
BRIAN KEISACKER:
BRIAN KEISACKER 649
BRIAN KEISACKER:
BRIAN KEISACKER DESPICABLE

BRIAN KEISACKER:

BRIAN KEISACKER IGNORES THE LAW

BRIAN KEISACKER:

BRIAN KEISACKER UNETHICAL 102

BRIAN KEISACKER:
BRIAN KEISACKER VIOLATED DUE PROCESS
BRIAN KEISACKER:
BRIAN KEISACKER IGNORES THE LAW
Brian Keisacker Mistake of law
BRIAN KEISACKER:

Brian Keisacker Unethical Lawyer

I CERTAINLY WOULD NOT RECOMMEND EVER HIRING THIS UNETHICAL LAWYER - BRIAN KEISACKER!
Brian Keisacker is Unethical
Brian Keisacker works for Ulrich, Scarlet, Wickman & Dean, P.A. in Sarasota, Florida.


One can only apply the facts and deduce that
Brian Keisacker is Unethical!

Brian Keisacker
BRIAN KEISACKER UNFAIR JUSTICE 2
Brian Keisacker
BRIAN KEISACKER unethical
Brian Keisacker
Brian Keisacker Outraged
Brian Keisacker
BRIAN KEISACKER Justice
Brian Keisacker
BRIAN KEISACKER 1
Brian Keisacker
Brian Keisacker Unprofessional Unethical

Brian Keisacker would rather be unethical, than follow the Sarasota County Ordinance 22-127(3).

From the transcript of August 15, 2019:
"…Attorney
Brian Keisacker, the rules -- the rules regulating the Florida Bar state that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. That rule is under the ethics Chapter 4, which is 4-8.4(d) as in David. I hereby request that you recuse yourself from this hearing and this board."

"…
I believe that you're violating the rules regulating the Florida Bar and I believe that it's unethical and you should not be serving on this board. And you've known for a long time that you derive income from the construction industry and are unqualified to serve on this board."
CHAIRMAN
KEISACKER: And if you feel that way, I invite you to inform the Florida Bar that you feel I'm in violation --
Arrogance and unethical behavior by
Brian Keisacker!
Brian Keisacker Due Process
Brian Keisacker
BRIAN KEISACKER Injustice 2
Brian Keisacker
BRIAN KEISACKER UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR
BRIAN KEISACKER
BRIAN KEISACKER unethical behavior
Brian Keisacker

SEE SARASOTA COUNTY ORDINANCE 22-127(3)

BRIAN KEISACKER

Brian Keisacker Sarasota, Florida.

SEE SARASOTA COUNTY ORDINANCE 22-127(3)

  • (c)  The term "Consumer Representatives" used in this section shall be defined as set forth in F.S. § 489.131(10).
(2) Quorum. The General Contractors Licensing and Examining Board shall require six members present for a quorum and a majority of affirmative votes shall be required for passage of any Board action. The Mechanical Contractors Licensing and Examining Board shall require six members present for a quorum and a majority of affirmative votes shall be required for passage of any Board action.
  • (3)  Qualifications. Architects and Engineers are not required to be professionally registered in the State of Florida as a condition of appointment to a Board. The citizen at large member (Lawyer Brian Keisacker) shall be selected for appointment from Sarasota County resident applicants deriving no income from any source connected with the construction industry. Appointment shall be based on demonstrable training and experience acceptable to the Board of County Commissioners. PLAIN AND SIMPLE! Brian Keisacker is defiant!
  • 4)  Term of Appointment. Board members shall be appointed for a period of three years. The Board of County Commissioners may relieve Licensing Board members of their appointment for failure to attend a majority of the meetings each fiscal year. The appointed members of the Boards shall proceed to select a Chairman, Vice Chairman and a Secretary.
If a lawyer, namely Brian Keisacker does not know what due process is, ignores the legal doctrine of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, did not giving proper notice to a litigant before issuing a ruling stated notice was given when it wasn’t that was overturned by the Circuit Court and who serves on a local Sarasota County contractor board illegally as a consumer representative in violation of the ordinance then what was the purpose of going to law school at Stetson Law School? Is Brian Keisacker untrained? Is Brian Keisacker that corrupt and one sided? Is Brian Keisacker purposefully ignorant to the law? Or is Brian David Keisacker corrupt? You decide and ask yourself, would you even dream about hiring Brian Keisacker for any reason after discovering who he is? All the above are supported by the facts!

It is our beliefs from personal experiences with lawyer Brian D. Keisacker, has violated Respondent’s constitution rights where Brian D. Keisacker as chairman of the Sarasota County General Contractors Licensing and Examining Board did not accord due process guaranteed under the United States Constitution and served as a consumer representative, Brian Keisacker is in clear violation of Sarasota County Ordinance 22-127(3), where Brian Keisacker earns income from the construction industry.
Yet
Brian Keisacker refuses to follow the law:

Brian Keisacker
Brian Keisacker sits on the Board as a “Citizen at large (consumer representative)," one of three such positions required by Sarasota County Code § 22-127(1)(a). Of note, "[t]he citizen at large member shall be selected for appointment from Sarasota County resident applicants deriving no income from any source connected with the construction industry." Sarasota County Code § 22-127(3) (emphasis added). See also, § 489.131(10), Florida Statutes (2019).
Brian Keisacker represents dozens of clients in matters that are directly related to the construction industry.

In a résumé submitted with Brian Keisacker’s advisory application, Keisacker states:


“Prepare and file pleadings, motions, and responses to all aspects civil litigation in areas including foreclosure, boundary disputes,
construction defects…”


Since Brian Keisacker practices construction law and collects fees from construction related clients, he is currently deriving income from the construction industry, which is prohibited for individuals serving on the Board in his capacity. Brian Keisacker’s application to serve on the Board clearly and definitively indicates Brian Keisacker derives income from the construction industry, thereby defeating the intended purpose of a citizen/consumer representative.
Brian Keisacker’s specializes in construction law and advertises on their website as follows:

“Our firm provides a variety of services to contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, homeowners in connection with construction law matters, including preparation, negotiation and review of construction agreements as well as the preparation and service of notices to owner, claims of lien, contractor final affidavits and other document required by the Florida Construction Lien Law. Should litigation become necessary to enforce or defend the claim of a construction lienor, we prosecute and defend all aspects of lien foreclosure actions.”

Therefore, Brian Keisacker must not be on the Sarasota County General Contractors Licensing and Examining Board, yet Brian Keisacker is defiant and will not follow the ethical rules Brian Keisacker is supposed to follow.
In sum, since
Brian Keisacker occupies a seat on the Board which forbids earning income from the construction industry, Brian Keisacker may NOT legally serve the citizens of Sarasota County on its General Contractors Licensing and Examining Board, and Brian Keisacker cannot and must not preside over matters within the jurisdiction of the Board. ALL Respondents have a right to be heard before a Board comprised of individuals who meet all of the statute and ordinance requirements for service on the Board. Brian Keisacker

BRIAN KEISACKER SHOULD NOT BE SERVING ON THE CONTRACTOR BOARD AS A CONSUMER REPRESENTATIVE WHEN HE EARNS INCOME FROM THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSRTY. THIS IS IMMORAL AND UNETHICAL.